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4 | Key findings
• In 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 169 incidents related, or suspected to be 
related, to anti-vehicle mines (AVMs)1 in 24 states and territories, a decrease of 
7 per cent compared with 2016. A total of 487 casualties 2 including 321 injured 
and 166 killed were recorded from these incidents, an increase of 15 per cent in 
comparison with 2016.
• Ukraine, Pakistan, Mali and Iran were the four states with the most recorded AVM 
incidents in 2017, followed by Chad, Syria, Western Sahara and Yemen. Since 2015, 
Ukraine has been the state with most recorded incidents for three consecutive years, 
and Mali has continuously featured among the top three affected states.
• Pakistan, Ukraine, Mali, Chad and Yemen were the states with the highest number 
of casualties in 2017. The highest number was recorded in Pakistan with 135 casualties 
which accounts for 28 per cent of the global total.
• In 2017, AVM incidents were most lethal when they involved a civilian vehicle. 
The lethality ratio, the ratio of those killed to overall casualties, of incidents involving 
civilian vehicles reached 40 per cent, while the ratio with overall non-civilian 
vehicles amounted to 23 per cent.
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The need for systematic data collection on AVM incidents was first recognised by 
the GICHD and SIPRI in a joint study on the humanitarian and developmental impact 
of anti-vehicle mines published in October 2014.3 Since 2015, the two organisations 
have been collecting global data on AVM incidents with the aim of improving evidence 
and identifying trends on the direct humanitarian impact of AVMs. Detailed and 




This report summarises data and analyses of AVM incidents in 2017. It follows up on 
similar reports published by the GICHD and SIPRI examining AVM incidents in 2015 
and 2016.5 This collection of data over three consecutive years allows for an initial 
comparative analysis on and trends of the humanitarian impact of AVMs.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This document draws on field reports provided by states, mainly national mine action 
authorities/centres, as well as mine action and other humanitarian organisations. Media 
reviews were conducted in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, 
Ukrainian and Urdu to complement the field reports.
In 2017, 119 out of 169 recorded incidents (70 per cent) were reported by 45 mine action 
programmes and organisations; 50 incidents were recorded from media sources. 
Compared with 2015 and 2016, when field reports represented 53 per cent and 44 per 
cent of the sample respectively, the stronger reliance on field reports in 2017 suggests 
a higher level of data accuracy. A more detailed description of the methodology and 
challenges of this research is available in Annex 1.
SOURCES OF INCIDENTS 6FIGURE 1
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8 | Global trends
In 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 169 incidents that were related, or suspected 
to be related, to AVMs in 24 states and territories. 7 This indicates a slight decrease in 
the number of incidents in comparison with both 2015 and 2016, although the scale has 
remained fairly stable across the three years (see Figure 2).
Among all countries where incidents were recorded, the highest number of incidents 
in 2017 were found in Ukraine, Pakistan, Mali and Iran. As in 2015 and 2016, Ukraine 
was the state where most incidents were recorded with, however, the same number 
of incidents as Pakistan in 2017 (31 incidents each).8 In 2017, Russia, Zimbabwe and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered AVM incidents for the first time since GICHD–SIPRI 
data collection began. Prior to this, they had recorded their last AVM incidents in 2009, 
2013 and 2014, respectively.9
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A total of 487 AVM casualties were recorded in 2017, including 321 injured and 166 killed. 
This represents an increase of 15 per cent against 2016 figures.10 Pakistan suffered 
the highest numbers of casualties (135), which accounts for 28 per cent of the global 
total—a notable increase compared with the previous year.11 While this spike 
may be partly explained by strengthened data collection, it is worth noting that a 
single incident in 2017 resulted in 27 casualties, after a civilian vehicle drove over a 
suspected AVM. This incident resulted in the highest recorded number of casualties 
globally that year.12
Absolute numbers of casualties are: Pakistan 135, Ukraine 74, Mali 62, Chad 47, Yemen 42, India 24, 
Afghanistan 21, Syria 18, Iran 12, Western Sahara 12, Sudan 11, Azerbaijan 10, Egypt 4, Lebanon 4, 
Angola 3, Cambodia 3, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1, Morocco 1, Russia 1, South Korea 1, Zimbabwe 1, 
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Initial analysis suggests that the states/territories with higher numbers of AVM casualties 
in 2017 tend to have had their last conflict more recently—or may still be in active 
conflict.13 At the same time, the long-term impact of AVM contamination is clearly 
observable with a number of states/territories still suffering from AVM casualties today, 
despite the conclusion of their last conflict dating back years or decades. 
Between 2015 and 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 528 AVM incidents that 
caused 1,508 casualties. This indicates that 503 people have been killed or injured 
from 176 incidents on average every year. This is significantly higher than the average 
of 250 AVM casualties from 2012 to 2014 (reported by the Landmine Monitor).14 
The highest numbers of casualties recorded by the GICHD and SIPRI between 2015 and 
2017 occurred in Ukraine, Pakistan, Mali, Syria and Yemen (see Table 1). These states 
alone account for two-thirds of the global three-year total.
Figure 4 visually depicts the three-year casualty trends by state/territory among those 
with the highest number of total casualties during this period. The downward curve 
observed in Syria is in stark contrast to the spikes observed in Pakistan and Chad. 
Conversely, recorded AVM casualties in Cambodia decreased from 17 in 2015 to 3 in 2017. 
This trend follows, albeit slightly delayed, the steady decline in overall mine/explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) casualties over the last years: between 2016 and 2017 alone, the 
latter dropped by 30 per cent after a 25 per cent decrease the year before.15 As a result, 
Cambodia no longer features among the eight states/territories with the highest, three-
year AVM casualty numbers.














Per cent of 
global casualties 
2015–2017
Ukraine 97 101 74 272 18%
Pakistan 74 52 135 261 17%
Mali 76 55 62 193 13%
Syria 90 38 18 146 10%
Yemen 65 32 42 139 9%
Afghanistan 34 34 21 89 6%
Chad 7 7 47 61 4%
Western Sahara 26 12 12 50 3%
STATES/TERRITORIES WITH HIGHEST NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES, 2015–2017TABLE 1






























CASUALTY TRENDS IN STATES/TERRITORIES WITH HIGHEST NUMBERS 
OF CASUALTIES, 2015–2017
FIGURE 4
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Mine and ERW contamination in Chad is essentially the result of the 1973 Libyan 
occupation of the Aozou Strip in the north of the country until its ultimate withdrawal 
in 1994, as well as of internal conflict.16 Amidst this decades-long conflict, Libyan 
forces placed large quantities of both anti-personnel mines (APMs) and AVMs.
The contamination by AVMs still needs to be surveyed further in many areas of the 
country, particularly in Borkou, Ennedi, Moyen-Chari and Tibesti17 regions. According 
to records of the National High Commission for Demining (HCND) in 2014, the 
Tibesti region accounted for about 64 per cent of Chad’s 103 km² of confirmed 
mined area.18 AVM contamination is particularly high in the north of the country. 
Clearance operations in the Zouar area in Tibesti region in 2015, for instance, resulted 
in almost 1,000 mines being found, 90 per cent of which were AVMs.19 GICHD–SIPRI 
data corroborate this finding: all of the AVM incidents recorded from 2015 to 2017,  
14 in total, occurred in Tibesti region 
(see Figure 5).
National data collection in Chad has 
traditionally been challenging and 
casualty reporting marked by yearly 
fluctuations. 21 This notwithstanding, 
GICHD–SIPRI data indicate that 
AVM casualties significantly spiked 
in 2017 (see Figure 6) as well as 
there being a strong prevalence of 
AVM compared with overall mine 
casualties. For instance, while 
HCND recorded 50 casualties in 
2017 from mines overall, 47 resulted 
from AVMs alone. 22
To contextualise the sharp increase 
in AVM casualties, HCND noted an 
“increase of ‘gold dust finder[s]’ 
(or gold panner[s]) in the north 
and an increase of Libyan cross-
border traffic.”23 Gold miners repre-
sented nearly two-thirds of the total 
CASE STUDY CHADBOX 1
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casualties, which is a notable increase from previous years. Incidents related 
to people prospecting for gold are characterised by a particularly high casualty 
number (e.g. 15 in 2017) due to the fact that prospectors usually travel in teams of 
10–20 workers per vehicle.24 Not surprisingly, civilians accounted for the overwhelm-
ing majority of casualties in Chad (see Table 2).
Still amongst the poorest areas of the country, the Tibesti region witnessed a hectic 
gold rush from 2013–2015 with an influx of unofficial gold miners from various 
Chadian ethnic groups and other countries. This eventually resulted in heightened 
competition over the region’s scarce resources, environmental deterioration 
and armed clashes between local communities and the miners, coupled with a 
reinforcement of security forces. Chad prohibited gold mining activities at the end 
of 2013. Whilst the rush lost much of its momentum, gold miners began to return 
to the north of the country by mid-2016.25
The high numbers of casualties testify to the considerable human security risk of mine 
contamination to civilian communities. In a recent report, the Small Arms Survey and 
Conflict Armament Research also point to the need for mine clearance in northern 
Chad for regional security, as minefields “can serve as storehouses for mines and 
explosives that can be used on other battlefields. […] Between 2005 and 2010 mines 
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CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES
From 2015 to 2017, 56 per cent of casualties on average were civilians where disaggre-
gated data were available (see Figure 7). Among the 44 per cent of non-civilian casualties, 
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CASUALTIES BY SEX AND AGE
In 2017, sex-disaggregated data were available for 58 per cent of reported AVM casualties 
(283 casualties). This is higher than in either 2015 or 2016, possibly due to an increase 
in more detailed field reports, as opposed to data from the media. In 2017, following a 
pattern observed in previous years, in cases where disaggregated data were available, 
nearly all casualties were male. By contrast, women and girls only accounted for 
6 per cent (see Figure 9). Apart from one peacekeeper in Ukraine, female casualties 
were exclusively civilian.30
Figure 8 shows a breakdown of casualties for 2017 alone. That year, the majority (247 out 
of 487) of recorded casualties were civilians (including humanitarian personnel)—which 
marks a proportional increase compared with the previous year (46 per cent in 2016)—
followed by national security forces (138 out of 487). Other categories of casualties made 
up for smaller proportions of this breakdown.29
© GICHD–SIPRI
CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES IN 2017FIGURE 8
Absolute numbers are: civilians 247 (incl. 8 humanitarian personnel), 
national security forces 138, peacekeepers 30, other combatants 19, 
international security forces 11, unknown 42 
= 10 people
  51% 
 Civilians
  28% 
 National security forces
  6% 
 Peacekeepers
  4% 
 Other combatants
  2% 
 International security forces
  9% 
 Unknown
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Age-disaggregated information was available in 43 per cent of recorded casualties 
(210 casualties). 92 per cent of casualties where age was known were adults, whereas 
























Absolute numbers are: male 265, female 18
Absolute numbers are: adults 194, children 16
Age disaggregation
210 out of 487 (43%) casualties 
with age-disaggregated data
CASUALTIES BY SEX AND AGE IN 2017FIGURE 9
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CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES
Analysing the proportion of incidents triggered by various categories of vehicles, results 
show that civilian vehicles and those of national security forces were the categories most 
impacted in 2017 (see Figure 10), in line with the trends of previous years.
CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES IN 2017FIGURE 10
Breakdown of the civilian vehicle sub-categories (70 incidents in total) 32
  44% 
 Civilian (excl. humanitarian)
  26% 
 National security forces
  8% 
 Peacekeeping
  5% 
 Other combatants
  4% 
 International security 
 forces
  3% 
 Humanitarian
  10% 
  Unknown
Absolute numbers are: civilian 70, national security forces 41, 
peacekeeping 12, other combatants 8, international security forces 6, 
humanitarian 5, unknown 16
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A civilian vehicle (agricultural, commercial and other civilian) triggered AVMs in 44 per 
cent (70 incidents) of recorded incidents involving a vehicle (158 incidents), as opposed 
to 49 per cent in 2016 (84 incidents). Among civilian vehicles, a proportional shift can 
be noted from agricultural (39 per cent among civilian vehicles in 2016 to 26 per cent 
in 2017) to commercial vehicles (10 per cent in 2016 to 18 per cent in 2017).33 Civilian 
vehicles are followed by vehicles belonging to national security forces (26 per cent) 
and peacekeeping vehicles (8 per cent).34
CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND LETHALITY RATIO
AVMs are designed to be triggered by and destroy vehicles and, due to their large 
explosive charge, tend to cause several casualties. While the global average of people 
killed or injured per AVM incident reached 2.9 in 2017, significant variations can be 
observed across states and territories. The average number peaks at 5.22 casualties 
per incident in Chad (see Table 2), where three out of nine recorded incidents caused 
10, 12 and 18 civilian casualties, respectively. This is a considerably higher ratio than the 
3.5 casualties per incident the year before. It is significant that two of these three incidents 
were related to gold mining activities in the Zouar area in Tibesti region (see Box 1).
In addition to the spike in Chad, other states also witnessed a noticeable increase in 
the number of casualties per incident, including Pakistan (from 2.89 in 2016 to 4.35 in 
2017) or Mali (from 2.12 in 2016 to 3.10 in 2017). In other states, the average remained 
at a constantly high level such as in Yemen (4.57 in 2016 and 4.67 in 2017) or Ukraine 










Per cent of 
casualties that 
were civilians
Per cent of 
casualties that 
were killed
Pakistan 31 135 4.35 52% 37%
Ukraine 31 74 2.39 27% 26%
Mali 20 62 3.10 44% 16%
Iran 13 12 0.92 100% 25%
Chad 9 47 5.22 98% 40%
Yemen 9 42 4.67 19% 55%
Syria 9 18 2.00 89% 94%
Western Sahara 9 12 1.33 25% 0%
CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND LETHALITY RATIO IN 2017TABLE 2
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The number of casualties per incident depends to a great extent on the nature of the 
vehicle involved, in addition to the number of passengers. It can, for instance, be noted 
that the decline in incidents with civilian vehicles in both absolute and relative terms from 
2016 to 2017 (see above) contrasts with the simultaneous increase in civilian casualties 
in the same period of time. Incidents with a civilian vehicle therefore led to a higher 
average number of casualties: the casualty rate per incident involving a civilian vehicle 
(excluding humanitarian) rose from 1.95 in 2016 to 3.07 in 2017. The corresponding rate 
for overall non-civilian vehicles reached 2.92 in 2017, only slightly higher than the year 
before. In 2017, national security forces suffered the highest average level of casualties 
per incident (see Table 3).
Similarly, the type of vehicle affected how deadly an incident was. The lethality rate, 
understood as the ratio of killed to overall casualties, of incidents with civilian vehicles 
(excluding humanitarian) in 2017 reached 40 per cent, while the rate with overall 
non-civilian vehicles was 23 per cent. At the level of individual categories, incidents with 
humanitarian vehicles recorded the highest lethality rate with 44 per cent (see Table 3).
These differences stem partly from the assumption that non-civilian vehicles are more 












Per cent of 
casualties that 
were killed
Civilian 70 215 3.07 40%
National security forces 41 143 3.49 24%
Peacekeeping 12 30 2.50 20%
Other combatants 8 17 2.13 29%
International security forces 6 11 1.83 18%
Humanitarian 5 9 1.80 44%
Unknown 16 47 2.94 36%
CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND LETHALITY RATIO PER CATEGORY 
OF VEHICLE IN 2017
TABLE 3
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Afghanistan is considered to be one of the most mine/ERW-affected countries in 
the world. Contamination is mainly due to the 10-year-long conflict that erupted 
with the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union in 1979, but it is also a 
result of internal armed conflict between 1992 and 1996 and the ongoing conflict 
subsequent to the toppling of the Taliban in 2001.35 30,716 people were recorded as 
known casualties at the end of 2017, of which close to 1,500 were due to AVMs.36
The majority of AVMs in Afghanistan are of low-metal content and were often laid 
without any pattern or evident record-keeping. Of the remaining known (suspected 
and confirmed) contamination of 654.1 km2 by the end of 2017, more than half of the 
area relates to AVMs (including mixed minefields), especially in Kandahar, Helmand 
and Farah provinces. However, new hazards from legacy AVM contamination are 
constantly being discovered, with a total of 115 km2 between 2014–2017.37
CASE STUDY AFGHANISTANBOX 2
DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF AVM CONTAMINATION ON AGRICULTURE 
IN KANDAHAR PROVINCE
FIGURE 11
Note: Highlighted in red are suspected or confirmed hazardous areas with no demining 
operations; in orange, where demining operations were ongoing as of December 2017.
© DMAC–UNMAS
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Further to its humanitarian impact, AVM contamination exerts a considerable strain 
on the country’s development. 37 out of 260 planned development projects at the 
end of 2017, related to road or railway infrastructure, and exploitation of natural 
resources, such as copper and oil, were hindered by AVMs. 61 per cent of AVM 
contamination affects agricultural production.38 This is exemplified in Figure 11, 
which shows an area in Kandahar province contrasting cultivated (green) and fallow 
land, the latter unexploited since it is contaminated.
In 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded eight AVM incidents causing 21 casualties, 
a 38 per cent decrease compared with the two previous years (34 casualties each 
year). The level of AVM casualties contrasts with that for APM, ERW and so-called 
pressure-plate improvised explosive device (PP-IED) casualties (see Figure 12).39 
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) noted an overall 
decrease of civilian casualties from most of these devices in 2017.40 This should not, 
however, mask the upward trend of the preceding years.41
According to UNAMA, improvised mines constructed as PP-IEDs in Afghanistan 
“function as victim-activated devices, triggered by any person stepping on them […] 
or any vehicle driving over them.” 42 In 2017, they accounted for 10 per cent of the 











COMPARISON OF CASUALTIES PER DEVICE TYPE  
IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2017
FIGURE 12
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and Uruzgan provinces in which hostilities continued and where devices were placed 
on roads used by military forces, but equally frequented by civilians.43
The scale of PP-IEDs—and victim-operated improvised explosive devices at large—
functioning as improvised AVMs is currently insufficiently understood, both at 
global level and in Afghanistan, due to a lack of institutionalised and rigorous data 
disaggregation. In an initial attempt to overcome this gap, the Directorate of Mine 
Action Coordination of Afghanistan used a proxy assumption whereby PP-IED 
incidents with more than two casualties were considered to be more likely related 
to an improvised AVM. 44 This analysis presents the following estimates:
This initial exercise illustrates that the impact of improvised AVMs may exceed that of 
industrially manufactured devices by several orders of magnitude. For such analysis 
and discussion to be meaningful and fully based on evidence, related data collection 
is required and methodological challenges addressed from the outset.








Improvised APM 385 77% 499 50%
Improvised AVM 115 23% 501 50%
500 1000
ESTIMATED DISAGGREGATION OF PP-IED INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES 
IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2017 45
TABLE 4
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In 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 169 incidents related, or suspected to be related, 
to AVMs in 24 states and territories. This represents a slight decrease from 178 incidents 
in 2015 and 181 incidents in 2016. A total of 487 casualties including 321 injured and 166 
killed were recorded from these incidents, a 15 per cent increase compared with 2016. 
As in previous years, civilians were the most affected category of casualties (51 per cent) 
followed by national security forces (28 per cent).
From 2015 to 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI collected evidence of 528 incidents related, or 
suspected to be related, to AVMs causing 1,508 casualties. Ukraine, Pakistan, Mali, Syria 
and Yemen accounted for the highest numbers of casualties, representing two-thirds of 
global casualties in this three-year period.
In particular, this report illustrates the relationship between casualty and lethality rates 
on the one side, and casualty demographics and types of vehicles on the other. In 2017, 
incidents with civilian vehicles tended to lead to a higher average of casualties than 
those with non-civilian vehicles. Similarly, civilians are significantly more vulnerable to 
fatalities than non-civilians.
For three consecutive years, the GICHD and SIPRI have consolidated the evidence on 
the extent, geography and patterns of the direct humanitarian impact of AVMs. Various 
issues deserve, however, to be scrutinised in greater depth. As illustrated by the case 
study on Afghanistan in this report, the scale and impact of AVMs of an improvised 
nature are presumably significant. Yet, comprehending the full magnitude of AVM impact 
requires more data, consistently coded and disaggregated across contexts.
Finally, greater focus is required to increase the evidence on the nexus between 
contamination from explosive ordnance at large, and from AVMs in particular, and the 
cost-effectiveness of humanitarian aid delivery, the return of the displaced in safety 
and dignity, and the returnees’ efforts to rebuild their lives and lay the foundations for 
sustainable development. This appears to be ever more relevant at a time when the 
international community is working towards an effective response to the global refugee 
and migration crises.
CONCLUSION
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ANNEX 1: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research methodology
This research draws on data from states, typically national mine action authorities/
centres, as well as from mine action and other humanitarian organisations. These reports 
were complemented by media reviews conducted in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, 
Russian, Spanish and Urdu. Due to the high number of recorded incidents and casualties 
in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, a media review in Ukrainian was added in the 2017 review.
Press articles were included, either because an incident was specially identified as 
AVM-related, or because an incident corresponded to a set of criteria that strongly 
indicated an AVM-related incident. These criteria included incidents such as those on 
roads outside of a city involving a vehicle, but excluding remotely-detonated or suicide 
bombs, and causing multiple casualties. In cases where the criteria strongly suggests 
an AVM-related incident, the incident is referred to as a suspected AVM incident. 
In some instances, mine action authorities and organisations were able to assess the 
relevance and accuracy of retrieved press articles.
IEDs may function as improvised AVMs.46 Focusing on industrial AVMs used in a 
conventional manner, this report excludes data related to AVMs of an improvised nature.
Incidents with an unknown number of casualties were categorised as incidents that 
resulted in casualties, but without specifying any absolute number. For incidents referring 
to a minimum number of casualties (“at least [number] casualties”), this minimum number 
was retained in this research. Furthermore, unless clearly attributed in the source, the 
vehicle category for incidents involving other combatants was defined as “unknown”.
The GICHD and SIPRI do not claim that the statistics presented in this report are complete 
and acknowledge possible under-reporting of casualties, nor do they claim responsibility 
for the accuracy and reliability of incident and media records retained for this report.
Data collection challenges
Data reported by states and organisations remain insufficient for a number of reasons. 
In some instances, states with suspected AVM incidents do not release information 
on mine contamination or incidents. In other cases, data remain incomplete due to 
the inability of national mine action authorities or organisations to access certain areas 
of the territory. This is often a challenge in conflict areas where data collection and 
verification are particularly difficult. The nature of these weapons, and the fact that AVM 
incidents often take place in rural areas, also make their reporting challenging, specifically 
regarding the exact location of incidents.
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Reports from states and organisations generally provide much more accurate and 
disaggregated information than media reports. Since the disaggregation of data is, 
to a large extent, dependent on reports from states and organisations, data collection 
becomes sensitive to the inactivity or closure of programmes due to a lack of funding or 
due to security concerns. This may, therefore, impact the ability to access detailed data 
from certain areas and to analyse trends and differences over years. The GICHD and 
SIPRI are continually engaging with new stakeholders in states/territories specifically 
in conflict areas, in order to ensure the most complete and long-term data collection.
Disaggregation of collected data based on the type of device is also a challenging 
task. It is often difficult to identify an AVM after detonation, in particular if specific 
circumstances, resources and the security situation do not allow a proper investigation 
to take place. In 2017:
• 23 incidents (14 per cent) were categorised as confirmed AVM incidents with 
an identified or likely mine type;
• 59 incidents (35 per cent) were categorised as confirmed AVM incidents with 
an unknown device type;
• 87 incidents (51 per cent) were categorised as suspected AVM incidents.
Despite their higher availability than in previous years, collecting disaggregated data on 
the sex and age of casualties still remains a challenge. In 2017, it was only possible to 
access data disaggregated by sex in 58 per cent of casualties and by age in 43 per cent 
of casualties.
26 |  Annexes
ANNEX 2: NOTES AND REFERENCES
1 In this report, AVMs are defined as landmines designed to detonate by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a vehicle. It covers a wide range of vehicles that operate on land 
including tanks. AVMs are also commonly known as anti-tank mines as well as mines 
other than anti-personnel mines.
2 Casualties refer to individuals who were physically injured or killed.
3 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Geneva International Centre  
for Humanitarian Demining (2014), The Humanitarian and Developmental Impact of  
Anti-Vehicle Mines (Geneva: GICHD and SIPRI).
4 GICHD–SIPRI interactive maps are available at http://www.gichd.org/avm  
(Accessed: 1 March 2018).
5 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (2016), Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents 
in 2015 (Geneva: GICHD and SIPRI); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2017), Global Mapping and 
Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents in 2016 (Geneva: GICHD and SIPRI).
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